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THE VIRTUOUS CORPORATION: ON CORPORATE
SOCIAL MOTIVATION AND LAW
Shlomit Azgad-Tromer* 
Above and beyond their traditional financial roles, contemporary 
corporations increasingly assume a normative role, promoting social 
agendas.  The myriad normative roles assumed by the corporation, from 
profit-centered corporate goodness to environmental and human rights 
corporate agendas and to corporate philanthropy, comprise an emerging 
corporate social identity.  This article asks what induces corporations to 
pursue social agendas and provides an initial taxonomy for corporate social 
motivation showing that the incentives to pursue normative corporate 
conduct are often rooted in the business purpose itself.  Central policy 
challenges are discussed, outlining the promise and the peril of emerging 
corporate social identities. 
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INTRODUCTION
Above and beyond their traditional financial roles, contemporary 
corporations are increasingly assuming a normative role, promoting social 
agendas well beyond their organizational boundaries.  According to 2015 
sustainability reports, the normative outreach of contemporary S&P 500 
corporations is growing with exuberance, notwithstanding their ultimate 
commitment to shareholder value.  Among other social causes, American 
corporations now tackle chronic malnutrition and hunger, fight disease 
pandemics, mitigate gender inequality, and promote human rights.1
 1.  See, e.g., Rita Vilk  et al., Gender and Corporate Social Responsibility: Big Wins 
for Gender and Society?, 156 PROCEDIA - SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 198, 198-202 
(2014) (discussing the rise of corporate action in addressing gender issues); Alistair Barr, 
Google’s “Don’t Be Evil” Becomes Alphabet’s “Do The Right Thing”, WALL ST. J.: DIGITS
(Oct. 2, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/10/02/as-google-becomes-alphabet-dont-be-
evil-vanishes/ [https://perma.cc/MFD3-FX7E] (discussing Alphabet Inc.’s motto “Do the 
Right Thing” and its corporate ancestor “Don’t be Evil”); Deepa Seetharaman & Anupreeta 
Das, Mark Zuckerberg and Priscilla Chan to Give 99% of Facebook Shares to Charity,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/mark-zuckerberg-priscilla-chan-to-
give-99-of-facebook-stock-to-philanthropy-1449005878 [https://perma.cc/3Z4X-B6UP] 
(discussing Mark Zuckerberg and Priscila Chan’s recent pledge to create a new “foundation 
that would initially focus on ‘personalized learning, curing disease, connecting people and 
building strong communities’” with 99% of their Facebook shares); Rachel Soares et al.,
Gender and Corporate Social Responsibility: It’s a Matter of Sustainability, CATALYST,
2011, 1-3 (exploring the connection between corporations’ treatment of gender issues and 
sustainability); Citizensship 2014 Performance Summary, DISNEY 4-7, https://ditm-twdc-
us.storage.googleapis.com/FY14-Performance-Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9WE-
KPWU] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017) (summarizing Disney’s efforts to have a positive 
corporate impact); Community: Creating Pathways to Opportunity, STARBUCKS,
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2017] THE VIRTUOUS CORPORATION 343 
Promotion of social agendas by corporations is one of the greatest 
controversies of corporate law.2  This paper exclusively focuses on a 
narrower mission:  to suggest an initial taxonomy of incentives underlying 
corporate social agendas.  Incentive analyses for corporate social agendas 
may shed light on the potential merit, and possible risks, of corporate social 
identities, to be further explored in future works. 
Social values are embedded in every corporate decision.  Corporations 
have always generated norms within their organizational boundaries, and 
social values are embedded in every corporate decision, from employment 
policies to customer service and business development.3  Yet, the social 
agendas assumed by contemporary corporations are open, dynamic, and 
diverse, stretching far beyond the corporate organizational boundaries and 
aiming to influence society as a whole.4  The myriad normative roles 
http://www.starbucks.com/responsibility/community [https://perma.cc/WYF2-UN8Y] (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2017) (discussing Starbucks’ declaration of corporate conscience); 
Foundation and Corporate Responsibility, BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB, CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 1 (2014), http://www.bms.com/Documents/foundation/BMS-
Corporate-Responsibility-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2RC-579F] (outlining Bristol-
Myers Squibb’s 2014 corporate social responsibility report and its mission to fight disease); 
Ikea FY15 Group Sustainability Report, IKEA 22-48,
http://www.ikea.com/ms/en_US/img/ad_content/2015_IKEA_sustainability_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5A6R-YPVQ] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017) (outlining Ikea’s environmental 
sustainability efforts). 
 2.  See, e.g., Christopher Geczy et al., Institutional Investing When Shareholders Are 
Not Supreme, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 73, 75-78 (2015) (analyzing the relationship between 
high fiduciary duty institutions and benefit corporations). See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., 
The Dangers of Denial: The Need for A Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and 
Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 761 (2015) (examining a pragmatic view of the effects of Delaware 
corporate law on corporate responsibility). 
 3.  See Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Supreme Court, 1952 Term, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91, 
91 (1953) (arguing that “government must recognize that it is not the sole possessor of 
sovereignty, and that private groups within the community are entitled to lead their own free 
lives and exercise within the area of their competence an authority so effective as to justify 
labeling it a sovereign authority.”).  Consider the norm-generating role taken by 
corporations in employee training.  The organization is a sphere of law and sovereignty, and 
institutional boundaries are used to define the breadth of corporate authority. See generally
Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, The Case for Consumer-Oriented Corporate Governance, 
Accountability and Disclosure, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 227 (2015) (discussing the need for 
corporate disclosure standards for businesses offering products or services to the public to 
enhance corporate informational accountability).  
 4.  See Fabrizio Cafaggi & Katharina Pistor, Regulatory Capabilities: A Normative 
Framework for Assessing the Distributional Effects of Regulation (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. 
Law and Legal Theory Working Grp., Working Paper No. 13-354, July 5, 2013), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2290218 (providing a theoretical discussion of self-determined 
norms and regulatory capability); see also Azgad-Tromer, supra note 3 (discussing further 
examples of these agendas); Howe, supra note 3 (providing examples of corporate social 
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assumed by the corporation, from profit-centered corporate goodness to 
environmental and human rights corporate agendas and to corporate 
philanthropy, comprise an emerging corporate social identity.  The article 
critically explores the strategic incentives underlying corporate social 
identities, showing that the social engagement of corporations is often 
rooted in the business purpose itself,5 and serving to satisfy the normative 
taste of various stakeholder constituencies, such as responsible investors,6
engaged employees,7 virtuous managers,8 and conscious consumers.9  A 
strategic analysis of incentives for corporate social motivation may serve to 
create a better architecture of corporate law, focusing on variances of 
corporate behavior that are less likely to be voluntarily addressed. 
agendas);.
 5.  For a survey of strategic value of corporate social responsibility, see generally
Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy and Society: The Link Between Competitive 
Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2006, at 1 
[hereinafter Strategy] (examining how businesses can be financially successful and socially 
responsible); Michel E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, The Competitive Advantage of Corporate 
Philanthropy, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2002, at 1 [hereinafter Advantage] (describing the 
add-value of corporate social responsibility).  
 6.  Anna Prior, Investors Follow Their Conscience, WALL ST. J. (July 17, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/investors-follow-their-conscience-1437154588 
[https://perma.cc/3KRX-DHCF]. 
 7.  See generally Christopher Marquis et al., Note, Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Employee Engagement, HARV. BUS. SCH. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR UNIT CASE NO.
410-138 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2038012 [https://perma.cc/SH5D-3ND5] 
(analyzing the link between CSR and employee engagement); Caroline Flammer & Jiao 
Luo, Corporate Social Responsibility as an Employee Governance Tool: Evidence from a 
Quasi-Experiment (Nov. 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2380336 
[https://perma.cc/6WFN-B9QP] (examining whether companies employ corporate social 
responsibility to improve employee engagement and to mitigate adverse workplace 
behavior).
 8.  See, e.g., Ronald W. Masulis & Syed Walid Reza, Agency Problems of Corporate 
Philanthropy 1 (ECGI, Finance Working Paper No. 370, 2014), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2234221 [https://perma.cc/W5K4-X8J5] (stating that corporate 
giving can reflect a CEO’s preferences).  
 9.  C.B. Bhattacharya, Diogo Hildebrand & Sen Sankar, Corporate Social 
Responsibility: A Corporate Marketing Perspective, 45 EUR. J. MKTG. 1353, 1353-1364 
(2011); C.B. Bhattacharya, N. Craig Smith & David Vogel, Integrating Social 
Responsibility and Marketing Strategy: An Introduction, 47 CAL. MGMT. REV. 6, 6-7 (2004); 
Amihai Glazer et al., Firms’ Ethics, Consumer Boycotts, and Signalling, 26 EUR. J. POL.
ECON. 340, 340-350 (2010); Jill Gabrielle Klein et al., Why We Boycott: Consumer 
Motivation for Boycott Participation, 68 J. MKTG. 92, 92-109 (2004); Jeff Fromm, 10
Things Millennial CEOs will Reimagine in America, FORBES (Apr. 8, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/onmarketing/2014/04/08/10-things-millennial-ceos-will-
reimagine-in-america/ [https://perma.cc/ED6C-3BTX] (stating that “[m]illennials expect 
brands to give back, be authentic and transparent”).  
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2017] THE VIRTUOUS CORPORATION 345 
Contemporary corporations celebrate their organizational conscience10
and actively promote social values in their normal business practice.  The 
business of corporate America is not simply business, it is virtuous 
business.  “If you want me to do things only for ROI [Return on 
Investment] reasons,” advised Apple’s CEO Tim Cook in defense of 
Apple’s environmental values, “you should get out of this stock.”11  This 
dash for virtue is induced and reported through sustainability reporting, 
thereby creating a transparent environment for non-financial corporate 
performance.12  Sustainability reporting encourages management to set 
goals, measure performance, and manage organizational change in a variety 
of social and moral issues.13  G4 standards issued by the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) set a format of recommended disclosures on stakeholder 
engagement, ethics and integrity, environmental and social management 
approaches, labor practices, decent work conditions, product responsibility, 
human rights and more.14  By 2017, it is highly customary for public 
corporations to disclose sustainability information;15 more than 6,000 
companies are now issuing sustainability reports,16 with 499 of the S&P 
 10.  For example, see Community: Creating Pathways to Opportunity, STARBUCKS,
http://www.starbucks.com/responsibility/community [https://perma.cc/N924-DUZ2] (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2017) (showing an example of a company publicly declaring corporate 
responsibility).
 11.  Geczy et al., supra note 2, at 75; Leif Johnson, Angry Tim Cook Tells Climate 
Change Skeptic to Get Out of Apple Stock, WEST MICH. DESIGN AND TECH. SOLUTIONS (Mar. 
3, 2014), http://www.wmtds.com/angry-tim-cook-tells-climate-change-skeptic-to-get-out-
of-apple-stock-2/ [https://perma.cc/J7CT-XUX5]. 
 12.  Mandating the disclosure of non-financial information about corporate 
performance in environmental, social and governance issues has become, by 2016, 
widespread, including countries such as the U.K., Denmark, South Africa, China, Malaysia, 
Brazil, Hong Kong, and India.  A recently published study suggests that mandatory 
sustainability disclosures are associated with increases in firm valuations, as reflected in 
Tobin’s Q. See Ioannis Ioannou & George Serafeim, The Consequences of Mandatory 
Corporate Sustainability Reporting: Evidence from Four Countries 2-3 (Harvard Business 
School, Research Working Paper No. 11-100, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1799589 
[https://perma.cc/HC79-25U5] (describing the countries that require non-financial corporate 
reports).
 13.  See GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, Preface to G4 SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING
GUIDELINES (2015), https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/GRIG4-Part1-
Reporting-Principles-and-Standard-Disclosures.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NW2-FJJW] (issuing 
guidelines to encourage corporate management to adopt sustainable initiatives). 
 14.  GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, G4 SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING GUIDELINES 9, 20, 
25, 43 (2015).
 15.  Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, Corporations and the 99%: Team Production Revisited, 21
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 163, 164, 194 (2016). 
 16.  Id. at 194 (citing Integrated Financial and Sustainability Reporting in the United 
States, INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH INSTITUTE (2013), 
http://irrcinstitute.org/pdf/FINAL_Integrated_Financial_Sustain_Reporting_April_2013.pdf
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346 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 19:2 
500 companies having made a sustainability disclosure or linked financial 
performance with a sustainability initiative.17
Corporations often adhere to the G4 format in reporting about their 
social impact and sustainability, but sometimes they report in their own 
format, deciding for themselves what matters in the sphere of their social 
doing and what activities should be classified as socially responsible.18
Nestle’s voluntary disclosure of November 2015, which reveals the fact 
that slavery and forced labor are present in its seafood supply chain, is a 
good example.  Nestle has voluntarily committed to employ protective 
measures in its global operations and to impose stricter standards on its 
suppliers.19  Kering is another good example:  in May 2015, it published an 
open-sourced environmental profit and loss account, voluntarily measuring 
its environmental footprint in its own operations and across its supply 
chains, and valuing it in monetary terms.20
Further social fuel is added to the corporate arena through alternative 
purpose firms, such as the benefit corporation, which are officially 
committed to social goals, despite potential conflicts with profit 
maximization.21  Finally, corporations promote normative agendas through 
philanthropy; according to statistics released by the Committee 
Encouraging Corporate Philanthropy’s (CECP) 2015 Giving in Numbers
report, median total giving as a percentage of pre-tax profit was one 
percent, both in 2012 and in 2014.22
) [https://perma.cc/C22A-WTVD]. 
 17.  Id.
 18.  See Ikea FY15 Group Sustainability Report, supra note 1 (making it a business 
priority to have a positive impact on the planet). 
 19.  Martha Mendoza, Nestlé Confirms Labor Abuse Among its Thai Seafood Suppliers,
THE SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 28, 2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/business/nestle-
confirms-labor-abuse-among-its-thai-seafood-suppliers-2/ [https://perma.cc/J62W-BFDU];
Nestlé Admits to Forced Labour in its Seafood Supply Chain in Thailand, THE GUARDIAN
(Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/nov/24/nestle-
admits-forced-labour-in-seafood-supply-chain [https://perma.cc/6Z9M-9R62].   
 20.  Kering is a corporate group in apparel and accessories markets, where it develops 
and maintains luxury sport and lifestyle brands.  Kering is present in more than 120 
countries and generated revenues of 10 billion in 2014 with more than 37,000 employees 
at year end.  The Kering stock is listed on Euronext Paris. See generally Environmental
Profit & Loss (E P&L), KERING (2013), http://www.kering.com/sites/ 
default/files/document/kering_epl_methodology_and_2013_group_results_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5FGH-PPQF]. 
 21.  Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: Who’s 
Opting In?,  14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247, 247-280 (2014); Hans Rawhouser, Michael 
E.Cummings & Andrew Crane, Benefit Corporation Legislation and the Emergence of a 
Social Hybrid Category, 57 CAL. MGMT. REV. 13, 13-35 (2015).
 22. CECP, Coalition Encouraging Corporate Philanthropy, is a coalition of CEOs 
“united in the belief that societal improvement is an essential measure of business 
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Part I of this article provides an initial taxonomy of incentives for 
corporate social motivation.  Corporations are induced to normative social 
conduct by the strategic demand of their stakeholder constituencies.23
Management’s ideology and social values, often labeled in the literature as 
agency costs,24 induce corporations to social conduct in compliance with 
management’s values.  Impact and responsible investors demand social 
performance and create incentives for normative corporate conduct.25
Employees are better engaged, easier to recruit and have lower turnover 
and higher productivity when working for normative corporate 
employers.26  Normative corporate conduct may also increase revenue, as 
consumers are more loyal to virtuous brands.27  Finally, corporations may 
performance” and whose mission is to “create a better world through business”. Giving in 
Numbers Report, CECP 10 (2015), http://cecp.co/measurement/benchmarking-
reports/giving-in-numbers.html [https://perma.cc/J33Q-67CF].  
 23.  For a survey of strategic values of corporate social responsibility, see generally
Porter & Kramer, Strategy, supra note 5, at 78; see also, Michel E. Porter & Mark R. 
Kramer, Creating Shared Value, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2011, at 89; Michael E. Porter 
& Mark R. Kramer, The Competitive Advantage of Corporate Philanthropy, HARV. BUS.
REV., Dec. 2002, at 56.
 24.  Howe, supra note 3; Azgad-Tromer, supra note 3; see also Part II A infra
(discussing the central policy challenges regarding corporate responsibility under soft 
corporate governance).  For a different view, see Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, 
Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560, 565 (2016) (describing 
management private values as idiosyncratic visions). 
 25.  See Part II B infra (discussing how corporate shareholders can influence companies 
to adopt high publicity social mindfulness campaigns).  Virtue and goodness have also been 
suggested to enhance shareholder financial value. See also generally Philipp Krüger, 
Corporate Goodness and Shareholder Wealth, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming) (discussing the 
positive shareholder reaction to deliberate corporate social responsibility aimed at 
improving investor relations).  Impact investments aim at making a beneficial social or 
environmental impact alongside a financial return. See Jacob Gray et al., Great 
Expectations: Mission Preservation and Financial Performance in Impact Investing,
WHARTON UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA: SOCIAL IMPACT INITIATIVE 3-4 (2015), 
https://socialimpact.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Great-Expectations-
Mission-Preservation-and-Financial-Performance-in-Impact-Investing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3MS5-2JU3] (examining to what extent these two objectives can coexist). 
 26.  BRADLEY K. GOOGINS, PHILIP H. MIRVIS & STEVEN A. ROCHLIN, BEYOND GOOD
COMPANY: NEXT GENERATION CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP 149 (2007); Marquis et al., supra
note 7; John Charlton, Blue-Chip Companies Seek Non-Cash Rewards, PERSONNEL TODAY
(Nov. 5, 2009), http://www.personneltoday.com/hr/blue-chip-companies-seek-non-cash-
rewards/ [https://perma.cc/7U4S-DQ5N] (cited in Marquis et al., supra note 7).
 27.  C.B. BHATTACHARYA ET AL., LEVERAGING CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE
STAKEHOLDER ROUTE TO MAXIMIZING BUSINESS AND SOCIAL VALUE (2011); C.B. 
Bhattacharya & Sankar Sen, Doing Better at Doing Good: When, Why, and How Consumers 
Respond to Corporate Social Initiatives, 47 CAL. MGMT. REV. 9, 9-24 (2004).  For analysis 
of customer values of corporate social responsibility, see John Peloza & Jingzhi Shang, The
Conference Board Governance Center, What Business Leaders Should Know: Investing in 
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engage in corporate virtue as a political strategy in order to avoid 
regulation by signaling compliance with social norms, or as a manipulation 
tactic aimed at achieving a desired regulatory result.28
Part II of this article provides a roadmap for the central policy 
challenges to the emergence of corporate social identities.29  Contemporary 
corporations have become norm-generating agents, creating non-binding 
rules for social activity and normative impact.30  The corporation’s norm-
generating role is a decentered process, where stakeholders participate in a 
dynamic and systemic integration of values into a voluntary,31 self-
determined corporate social identity.32  The resulting reflexive network of 
corporate social identities is proliferated by soft global standardization, 
setting normative and reporting guidelines for corporate social conduct 
such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), the Sustainable Accounting 
Standards Board (SASB), the UN Global Conduct Principles, the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and ISO 26000.33  The rise of 
corporate social motivation suggests a shift from substantive corporate law 
towards a decentered and reflexive network of diverse corporate social 
CSR to Enhance Customer Value, 3 DIR. NOTES SERIES 1-8 (Feb. 2011) (discussing what 
customers most value with corporate social responsibility and how it affects profit). 
 28.  David P. Baron, Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Integrated 
Strategy, 10 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 7, 7-45 (2001); Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 
Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility, 77 ECONOMICA 1, 2 (2010).
 29.  See generally Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from 
Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 571, 579 (2008) (explaining that the term “soft 
law” usually refers to “a rule issued by a lawmaking authority that does not comply with . . . 
formalities . . . that are necessary for the rule to be legally binding”).
 30. See Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 231 (2015) 
(discussing this phenomenon in an international context).  
 31.  See generally Strine, supra note 2 (explaining that the protection of non-investor 
constituencies within corporation law itself is not currently available under Delaware law, 
with the one exception of the benefit corporation, while other constituencies are protected 
through externality regulations). 
 32.  See generally Cafaggi & Pistor, supra note 4 (discussing the theory of self-
determined norms and regulatory capabilities). 
 33.  See GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 14; Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD)
(2011), http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/ [https://perma.cc/DB6D-JPZQ]; ISO 26000 – 
Social Responsibility, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION (2014),
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/iso26000.htm [https://perma.cc/7L7M-G3XD]; 
SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD (SASB), http://www.sasb.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/RAE8-FHJL]; The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, UNITED
NATIONS, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles 
[https://perma.cc/QTC4-HZ6S] (last visited Jan. 29, 2017) (all setting forth their standards, 
as non-governmental organizations, for sustainable best practices for multi-national 
corporations). 
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identities, governed by soft global standardization.34
The normative quest makes corporate performance vague and subject 
to manipulation.35  Law can be specific, whereas morality is ultimately 
vague, leaving room for self-interested interpretation.36  The rise of 
corporate social identities is thus the rise of what Katharina Pistor calls 
“Corporate Legal Particularism,” a self-contained legal order that serves 
particular interests.37  Corporate social identities do not necessarily align 
with social normative preferences.  In particular, distributional preferences 
of corporate leadership do not necessarily align with those channeled 
through the tax system according to social interest,38 as demonstrated by the 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Tax straddle.  Indeed, social norms 
and corporate social identities may serve as normative substitutes.  The rise 
of corporate social identities may thus pose a challenge to the democratic 
ideal.
I. STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL MOTIVATION
Why do corporations engage in social causes?  What drives corporate 
normative social conduct?  This part of the article provides a taxonomy of 
corporate incentives to engage in normative agendas, suggesting that 
corporate social identities emerge to cater the demand for social agendas 
introduced by corporate stakeholder constituencies: investors, employees, 
and consumers, as well as by the management’s private values and 
idiosyncratic visions.39  Finally, normative corporate social conduct may 
serve as a political strategy promoting the corporation’s core business 
missions. 
 34.  See, e.g., id.
 35.  See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Idealism That May Leave Shareholders Wishing for 
Pragmatism, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/14/
business/dealbook/laureate-education-for-profit-school-public-benefit.html
[https://perma.cc/UKR3-94YA] (discussing the vague corporate goals of some public 
benefit corporations and the questions this raises from shareholders). 
 36.  See Steven Shavell, Law Versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct, 4 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 227, 242-43 (2002) (describing how the flexibility of soft corporate governance 
often makes corporate social conduct disappointing, due to different conceptions of good by 
various parties). 
 37.  Katharina Pistor, Corporate Legal Particularism (June 17, 2016) (unpublished 
paper for “Forms of Pluralism and Democratic Constitutionalism” conference in Paris) (on 
file with author).  
 38.  Bhattacharya, Smith, & Vogel, supra note 9; Bhattacharya, Hildebrand, & Sankar, 
supra note 9; Glazer et al., supra note 9; Klein et al., supra note 9. 
 39. Why is a Benefit Corp Right for Me?, BENEFIT CORPORATION,
http://benefitcorp.net/businesses/why-become-benefit-corp [https://perma.cc/89SD-WDXR] 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2017) (listing reasons to incorporate as a benefit corporation). 
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A. Management Values: Idiosyncratic Visions and Agency Costs 
When corporations engage in social values, managerial leadership gets 
the privilege of directing corporate social contribution towards its own 
normative goals and visions.40  Managers and controlling shareholders have 
the prerogative to pursue their subjective values and normative preferences 
as part of their idiosyncratic visions for the corporation.41  Idiosyncratic 
visions do not have to concern an innovation or invention:  as long as the 
corporate leadership, management, controlling shareholders or 
entrepreneurs have a plan they subjectively believe would lead the 
corporation to merit, they have an idiosyncratic vision for corporate 
leadership.  The identity of the beneficiaries of corporate social agendas 
may naturally be affected by management’s private interests and values, as 
embedded in the corporate leadership. 
Several researchers argue that corporate social conduct is a 
manifestation of managerial agency problems inside the firm, enhancing 
management’s value at the expense of shareholders.42  Researchers found 
empirical support for three key indicators of an agency motive for 
corporate social conduct.43  First, increasing insider ownership decreases 
measures of firm goodness.44  Firms with moderate levels of insider 
ownership cut goodness by more than firms with low levels (where the tax 
cut has no effect) and high levels (where agency is less of an issue).45
Second, improved governance reduces corporate goodness.  A regression 
discontinuity design of close votes around the fifty percent cut-off finds 
that passage of shareholder governance proposals leads to slower growth in 
goodness.46  Third, the use of corporate jets is correlated with corporate 
 40.  See generally Donald V. Moser & Patrick R. Martin, A Broader Perspective on 
Corporate Social Responsibility Research in Accounting, 87 ACCT. REV. 797, 797-806 
(2012) (discussing new research methods for corporate social responsibility).  
 41.  See Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision,
125 YALE L.J. 560, 565-66 (2016) (describing controlling shareholders as entrepreneurs 
instead of the prevailing view that they act to the detriment of minority shareholders). 
 42.  See Krüger, supra note 25, at 5-6 (discussing the effects of corporate social 
responsibility on the stock market).  See also Bénabou & Tirole, supra note 28, at 1-19 
(providing a commentary on agency issues relating to CSR); Ing-Haw Cheng, Harrison 
Hong & Kelly Shue, Do Managers Do Good with Other People’s Money? 1-2 (Fama-Miller 
Working Paper, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1962120 [https://perma.cc/QH6D-CGCA] 
(discussing similar agency motives relating to corporate social responsibility). 
 43.  Id.
 44.  Cheng, Hong & Shue, supra note 42, at 2-4. 
 45.  Id.
 46.  Id.
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goodness.47  Other research indicates that as giving increases, shareholders 
reduce their valuation of cash holdings, suggesting corporate giving is a 
manifestation of agency conflicts that reduce firm value.48  Further, 
dividend increases are also associated with reduced corporate giving.49
Corporate giving is typically associated with CEO charity preferences, 
indicating that firm donations advance CEO interests and studies suggest 
that the misuse of corporate resources reduces firm value.50
B. Impact and Responsible Investments 
“Investors follow their conscience,” says a Wall Street Journal
headline from July 2015,51 referring to moral trends of investments, 
actively seeking to boost investors’ portfolios with virtuous corporations.  
This “can encompass everything from boosting worker retention through 
fair pay and good working conditions to preserving natural resources and 
having a minimal impact on the environment.”52  Indeed, investors pay 
increasing attention to non-financial social corporate performance and 
sustainability matters.53  Asset managers seeking to promote moral values 
are now so common that research firms dedicated to social and moral 
assessment provide resources for “environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) research.”54  According to the research firm Morningstar, as of 30 
 47.  Id.
 48.  See generally Ronald W. Masulis & Syed Walid Reza, Agency Problems of 
Corporate Philanthropy, REV. FIN. STUD. 4,  (forthcoming) (European Corporate 
Governance Institute, Working Paper No. 370, 2014) (finding that corporate giving 
decreases firm value).
 49.  Id.
 50.  Id. at 2.
 51.  Prior, supra note 6. 
 52.  Id.
 53.  See generally Sarah Dadush, Regulating Social Finance: Can Social Stock 
Exchanges Meet the Challenge?, 37 U. PA. J. INT’L. L. 139, 139-230 (2015) (discussing the 
merits of investing in enterprises that cater to poor and underserved populations); CENTER
FOR POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY & ZICKLIN CENTER FOR BUSINESS ETHICS AT THE WHARTON
SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, THE 2015 CPA-ZICKLIN INDEX OF 
CORPORATE POLITICAL DISCLOSURE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 8 (2015) (finding that 
increasingly large numbers of corporations have chosen to disclose their political spending 
for the sake of ethical transparency); GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY INSTITUTE, INC.,
SUSTAINABILITY — WHAT MATTERS? 3 (2014) (stating similar findings); KPMG LLP,
CURRENTS OF CHANGE: THE KPMG SURVEY OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING
2015 28-30 (2015) (showing that an increasingly large portion of companies are choosing to 
engage in corporate responsibility reporting). 
 54.  About Us, EIRIS, http://www.eiris.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/7VDB-M6W3] 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2017) (identifying itself as a “leading global provider of environmental, 
social and governance (ESG) research, empowering responsible investors with independent 
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June 2015, investors have poured nearly $8.2 billion into socially minded 
stock and bond funds since 2013.55  Total assets in such funds have grown 
roughly 59% over the past five years, to $72.6 billion, while assets in all 
mutual funds have risen 52% to $12.5 trillion.56  Here is an illustration of 
assets flowing to mutual funds with a socially responsible mandate in 
recent years: 
ILLUSTRATION 1 :ASSETS FLOWING INTO MUTUAL FUNDS
WITH A SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE MANDATE57
Socially responsible investments are generally motivated by normative 
considerations, yet some empirical evidence suggests that they have 
supplemental economic merit.58  To list a few examples:  a higher CSR 
score is on average associated with lower idiosyncratic risk,59 a lower 
probability of financial distress,60 lower cost of capital,61 more positive sell-
analysis and the tools to incorporate this information into investment decisions”). 
55.  Id.
56.  Id.
 57.  Prior, supra note 6. 
 58.  See generally Azgad-Tromer, supra note 15 (providing an analysis of institutional 
investors as agents of the general public and the costs accompanying this agency). 
 59.  Darren D. Lee & Robert W. Faff, Corporate Sustainability Performance and 
Idiosyncratic Risk: A Global Perspective, 44 FIN. REV. 213, 225 (2009). 
 60.  Allen Goss, Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Distress, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE ADMIN. SCIENCE ASS’N OF CANADA 1 (2009). 
 61.  Dan S. Dhaliwal et al., Voluntary Nonfinancial Disclosure and the Cost of Equity 
Capital: The Initiation of Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting, 86 ACCT. REV. 59, 60 
(2011); Sadok El Ghoul et al., Does Corporate Social Responsibility Affect The Cost of 
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side analysts’ recommendations,62 and higher abnormal returns and long-
term post-acquisition returns.63  Ferrell, Liang, and Renneboog find that 
corporate social responsibility is associated with managerial pay-for-
performance and maximization of firm value.64  Eccles, Ioannou, and 
Serafeim show that companies voluntarily adopting environmental and 
social policies, outperform their counterparts over the long term, in terms 
of both stock market and accounting performance.65  The outperformance is 
stronger in sectors where the customers are retail consumers.66  Cheng, 
Ioannou, and Serafeim show that firms with better corporate social 
responsibility performance face significantly lower capital constraints.67
Other scholars have shown that socially responsible firms are likely to 
deliver more transparent and reliable financial information to investors, as 
compared to firms that do not meet the same social criteria and are less 
likely to manage earnings through discretionary accruals, to manipulate 
real operating activities, and to be the subject of SEC investigations.68  Raj 
Sisodia, David Wolfe, and Jagdish Sheth have selected firms on the basis 
of their humanistic profiles, including their sense of purpose; how well they 
are loved by customers, team members, suppliers, and communities; and 
their culture and their leadership.  They find that those humanistic firms 
outperformed their market on a nearly nine-to-one ratio over a period of ten 
years.69  Further research by Sisodia et al. reveals that the same companies 
Capital?, 35 J. BANK. AND FIN. 2388, 2389 (2011); Allen Goss & Gordon S. Roberts, The
Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on the Cost of Bank Loans, 35 J. BANK. & FIN.
1794, 1795 (2011). 
 62.  Robert G. Eccles, George Serafeim & Michael P. Krzus, Market Interest in 
Nonfinancial Information, 23 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 113, 127 (2011); see also Ioannis 
Ioannou & George Serafeim, The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Investment 
Recommendations, 1 ACAD. OF MGMT. ANN. MEETING PROC. 1, 1-6 (2010) (finding that 
positive corporate governance and environmental ratings impacted analysis).  
 63.  Xin Deng, Jun-koo Kang & Buen Sin Low, Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Stakeholder Value Maximization: Evidence from Mergers, 110 J. FIN. ECON. 87, 89 (2013).
 64.  Higher CSR is closely related to tighter cash, a proxy for better-disciplined 
managerial practice, and higher pay-for-performance sensitivity. Allen Ferrell et al., Socially
Responsible Firms 3-4, 31 (European Corporate Governance Institute, Working Paper No. 
432/2014, 2016).
 65.  Robert G. Eccles, Ioannis Ioannou & George Serafeim, The Impact of Corporate 
Sustainability on Organizational Processes and Performance, 60 MGMT. SCI. 2835, 2835-
2836 (2014).
 66.  Id. at 2838. 
 67.  Beiting Cheng, Ioannis Ioannou & George Serafeim, Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Access to Finance, 35 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1, 1-23 (2014).
 68.  Yongtae Kim, Myung Seok Park & Benson Wier, Is Earnings Quality Associated 
with Corporate Social Responsibility?, 87 ACCT. REV. 761, 790 (2012). 
 69.  RAJ SISODIA ET AL., FIRMS OF ENDEARMENT: HOW WORLD-CLASS COMPANIES
PROFIT FROM PASSION AND PURPOSE 14 (Jeanne Glasser Levine et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2007). 
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outperform the S&P 500 by a factor of 10.5 over a period of fifteen years 
from 1996 to 2011.70  Ethisphere has produced an annual list of the world’s 
most ethical companies, assessed in terms of corporate citizenship and 
responsibility, corporate governance, innovation that contributes to well-
being, industry leadership, executive leadership, regulatory and reputation 
track record, and internal systems of ethics or compliance programs.71  The 
selected companies outperformed the S&P 500 “every year since the 
inception of the program in 2007, by an average of 7.3 percent annually.”72
Charity is also associated with corporate performance.  Lev, Petrovits, 
and Radhakrishnan find that charitable contributions are significantly 
associated with future revenue, a result particularly pronounced for firms 
that are highly sensitive to consumer perception, where individual retail 
consumers are the predominant customers.73  As the following illustrations 
demonstrate, corporate social giving is correlated with better performance, 
higher growth rates, and increased revenue. 
ILLUSTRATION 2: FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE AND 
CORPORATE GIVING74
 70.  JOHN MACKEY & RAJ SISODIA, CONSCIOUS CAPITALISM: LIBERATING THE HEROIC
SPIRIT OF BUSINESS 101 (2014).
 71.  Id. at KINDLE location 4708.
 72.  Id.
 73.  Baruch Lev, Christine Petrovits & Suresh Radhakrishnan, Is Doing Good Good for 
You? How Corporate Charitable Contributions Enhance Revenue Growth, 31 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 182, 182-184, 198 (2010).
 74.  Giving in Numbers Report, supra note 22, at 7.
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ILLUSTRATION 3: REVENUE FROM SUSTAINABLE PRODUCTS
AND SERVICES 75
C. Employee Engagement 
Corporate social identities may give corporations leverage in 
connecting, recruiting, and motivating employees’ performance.76  Studies 
have shown that more than seventy percent of employed Americans 
deciding between two jobs offering the same location, job description, pay, 
and benefits would choose to work for a company that also supports 
charitable causes.77  For high-value employees, cash is no longer king, and 
there are numerous other emotions corporations need to address in 
recruiting employees and engaging them in the corporate mission.78  To 
connect and engage employees, companies need to engage their human 
identities and address their values.79  Field studies show that employees 
involved in philanthropic initiatives showed a statistically significant 
increase in their sense of identification with their respective corporate 
employers, an increase also correlated with improved job performance.80
 75.  Id. at 8.
 76.  Marquis et al., supra note 7.
 77.  TERENCE LIM, MEASURING THE VALUE OF CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY: SOCIAL
IMPACT, BUSINESS BENEFITS, AND INVESTOR RETURNS 31 (Committee Encouraging 
Corporation Philanthropy 2010).
 78.  Marquis et al., supra note 7, at 2 (citing John Charlton, Blue-Chip Companies Seek 
Non-Cash Rewards, PERSONNEL TODAY (Nov. 5, 2009), 
http://www.personneltoday.com/hr/blue-chip-companies-seek-non-cash-rewards/).
 79.  Googins, supra note 26, at 149.
 80.  David A. Jones, Does Serving the Community Also Serve the Company? Using 
Organizational Identification and Social Exchange Theories to Understand Employee 
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Employees with a positive view of their organization’s corporate social 
responsibility commitment also rate senior management as having high 
integrity.81  Ethisphere’s selected companies have been found to enjoy 
lower team member turnover.82
Corporate social responsibility often engages employees as the 
beneficiaries of accountability, committing to “a great place to work,” 
diversity, professional training and development, and wellness and benefits.  
Significantly, corporate social responsibility engages employees in 
contributing to other stakeholder constituencies:  for example, better 
customer service, as well participation in the corporation’s social agenda.83
Because employees search for meaning and values, a framework for 
corporate social identity may be part of the moral “employee value 
proposition” retaining individuals to the corporation and urging them to 
stay longer and give their personal best.84
Engaging employees is a significant priority for corporations.  
Corporate America struggles with making its employees fully engaged and 
committed to its business, as the following illustration shows: 
ILLUSTRATION 4: 2014 EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENT IN THE 
U.S.85
Responses to a Volunteerism Programme, 83 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ORG. PSYCHOL. 857, 858-
61 (2010).
 81.  Marquis et al., supra note 7, at 3.
 82.  MACKEY & SISODIA, supra note 70, at KINDLE location 4708. 
 83.  See, e.g., CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT, INSPIRING CITIZENSHIP: CORPORATE
CITIZENSHIP REPORT 2014-2015 43, 76 (2014-2015) (referring to employee engagement both 
when employees are the beneficiaries and when other constituencies are the beneficiaries; 
for example, rewards for customer service, which benefit both customers and shareholders, 
and volunteering in the community, which benefits the public).  
 84.  C.B. Bhattacharya, Sankar Sen & Daniel Korschun, Using Corporate Social 
Responsibility to Win the War for Talent, 49 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 37, 37 (2008).
 85.  Amy Adkins, Majority of U.S. Employees Not Engaged Despite Gains in 2014,
GALLUP (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/181289/majority-employees-not-
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Corporate social identities are particularly appealing to the younger 
workforce of Generation Y.86  Nearly seven of ten millennials say they are 
aware of their employer’s commitment to social and environmental causes, 
and sixty-five percent say that their employer’s social and environmental 
activities “make them feel loyal to the company.”87  A study at Stanford 
Business School suggests that corporate social responsibility can provide 
incentives that are potentially more alluring than monetary compensation: 
more than 90% of the MBAs in the study sample were willing to make a 
financial sacrifice and forgo financial benefits in order to work for a firm 
with a better reputation for corporate social responsibility and ethics.88
D. Marketing and Customer Relations 
Corporations may engage in corporate social conduct as a signal for 
the company’s virtuous social identity, aiming consumers to attribute virtue 
to their brands.89  Bhattacharya and Sen refer to “consumer-company 
identification” (CCI) as an extension of social identity theory.90
Consuming the moral brand of a virtuous corporation may contribute to 
engaged-despite-gains-2014.aspx [https://perma.cc/AD5U-N8ZU].
 86.  Generation Y, also referred to as “Millennials,” are individuals born between 1978-
1998, who seek “more responsibility and advancement . . . and highly prioritize these 
qualities over job security.”  Marquis et al., supra note 7, at 4; see Generation Y: 
Powerhouse of the Global Economy, DELOITTE DEVELOPMENT LLC 4-11 (2009), 
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/human-capital/us-consulting-
hc-generationy-snapshot-041509.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DVU-5ART] (describing 
Generation Y traits and how employers can capitalize on those traits); see also KATHLEEN
SHAPUTIS, THE CROWDED NEST SYNDROME: SURVIVING THE RETURN OF ADULT CHILDREN 99 
(1st ed. 2004) (coining Generation Y as “Generation Peter Pan” for its “delaying rites of 
passage into adulthood” and refusal to grow up); Millennials, WIKIPEDIA
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennials#Traits [https://perma.cc/V3VU-QNAN] (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2017) (explaining various characteristics of the generation).  
 87.  Marquis et al., supra note 7, at 4 (quoting CONE INC. & AMP AGENCY, THE 2006
CONE MILLENNIAL CAUSE STUDY).
 88.  Bill Snyder, For MBA Grads, Corporate Responsibility Trumps Salary, STANFORD
BUSINESS: INSIGHTS (June 1, 2008), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/mba-grads-
corporate-responsibility-trumps-salary [https://perma.cc/XBQ2-YNSG] (describing the 
findings in the Stanford Business School study); see also David B. Montgomery & 
Catherine A. Ramus, Corporate Social Responsibility Reputation Effects on MBA Job 
Choice 7 (Stanford Graduate School of Business, Working Paper No. 1805, 2003),
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/working-papers/corporate-social-
responsibility-reputation-effects-mba-job-choice [https://perma.cc/DEH5-U79T]. 
 89.  John C. Turner & Katherine J. Reynolds, The Story of Social Identity, in
REDISCOVERING SOCIAL IDENTITY 13-22 (Tom Postmes & Nyla R. Branscombe eds., 2010).  
 90.  C.B. Bhattacharya & Sankar Sen, Consumer-Company Identification: A 
Framework for Understanding Consumers’ Relationships with Companies, 67 J. MKTG. 76, 
76, 86 (Apr. 2003).
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consumers’ self-esteem, attaching consumers to the firm and enhancing its 
brand value.91  Corporate social conduct has the potential to create value for 
consumers, and it is the customer perception of this value that mediates the 
relationship between corporate social conduct and subsequent financial 
performance.92  Ethisphere’s list of most-ethical corporations has been 
found to enjoy better brand reputation and higher customer loyalty.93
Cabral suggests there is a positive relationship between trust and the price 
customers are willing to pay for a product or service—the higher the trust, 
the more customers are willing to pay.94  In addition, the more consistent 
the transactions that take place between a seller and a buyer, the harder it is 
to break any trust previously built between them (whether good or bad).95
Cabral’s theory suggests there is a negative relationship between reputation 
and the amount of money the corporation must invest in improving their 
reputation.  As reputation increases, corporate leaders can invest 
incrementally less in building their reputation without hurting the progress 
they’ve made.96  High trust and reputation can together help corporations 
earn higher profits.97  A corporation can not only increase the price of its 
products and services, it can also decrease its expenses (the amount of 
money invested in reputation management).98
Consumers affect corporate morality with a stick, and not only a 
carrot.  Firms deviating from accepted social and moral norms risk decline 
in sales due to consumer boycotts.  To list just a few recent examples, 
Nestlé suffered a consumer boycott after selling inappropriate milk to 
pregnant mothers in developing countries;99 Nike was boycotted over 
alleged sweatshop conditions at Asian suppliers;100 Shell suffered a boycott 
 91.  BHATTACHARYA ET AL., supra note 27; Bhattacharya & Sen, supra note 27, at 15-
17.
 92.  For analysis of customer values of Corporate Social Responsibility, see generally 
Peloza & Shang, supra note 27 (explaining the value that corporate social responsibility 
activities can create for customers and practical recommendations for creating corporate 
social responsibility programs). 
 93.  MACKEY & SISODIA, supra note 70, at KINDLE location 4708.
 94.  Luís M B Cabral, The Economics of Trust and Reputation: A Primer 26 (June 
2005) (unpublished manuscript),  http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~lcabral/reputation/ 
Reputation_June05.pdf [https://perma.cc/DUF6-6FVC].
 95.  Id. at 7-8.
 96.  Id. at 20.
 97.  Id. at 14-19.
 98.  Id.
 99.  See Nestlé-free Zone, BABY MILK ACTION http://www.babymilkaction.org/ 
nestlefree [https://perma.cc/JA23-CAGU] (last visited Jan. 30, 2017) (describing the details 
of the boycott of Nestle’s baby food due to it breaching international marketing standards). 
 100.  Simon Birch, How Activism Forced Nike to Change Its Ethical Game, THE
GUARDIAN (July 6, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/green-living-
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because of its plan to sink the Brent Spar oil platform at sea.101  The more 
egregiously a consumer perceives the firm’s behavior, the more likely she 
is to boycott.102  Boycotts thus serve a mechanism by which consumers can 
hold firms accountable to perceived transgressions of corporate 
normativity.103
E. Political Strategy 
Corporations do not act in a political vacuum.  Corporate social 
conduct could be a means of placating regulators and public opinion to 
avoid strict supervision in the future, or of attempting to raise rivals’ costs 
by encouraging environmental, labor, or safety regulations that will 
particularly handicap competitors.104  Organizational resources devoted to 
corporate social conduct are aligned with the corporate business mission so 
as to create a positive, virtuous public image of the corporation and thereby 
leverage the corporation’s agendas with regulators and public officials.105
II. CENTRAL POLICY CHALLENGES
This part of the article provides a roadmap for some of the central 
policy challenges of the emerging corporate social identities. Contemporary 
corporations have become norm-generating agents, creating non-binding 
rules for social activity and normative impact.106  The rise of corporate 
social motivation suggests a shift from substantive corporate law towards a 
decentered and reflexive network of diverse corporate social identities, 
governed by soft global standardization.107  The normative quest makes 
blog/2012/jul/06/activism-nike [http://perma.cc/6YC3-VZ2A].  
 101.  Nathanel C. Nash, Oil Companies Face Boycott Over Sinking of Rig, N.Y. TIMES
(June 17, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/17/world/oil-companies-face-boycott-
over-sinking-of-rig.html [https://perma.cc/25PC-HH2Z]. 
 102.  Klein et al., supra note 9, at 93-96. 
 103.  N. Craig Smith, Corporate Social Responsibility: Whether or How?, 45 CAL.
MGMT. REV. 52, 60-61 (2003).
 104. Baron, supra note 28, at 12-13.
 105.  Bénabou & Tirole, supra note 28, at 12.
 106.  Arato, supra note 30, at 231-232. 
 107. The term “soft law” usually refers to “a rule issued by a lawmaking authority that 
does not comply with . . . formalities . . . that are necessary for the rule to be legally 
binding.”  Gersen & Posner, supra note 29.
 Examples include, but are not limited to, SASB, supra note 33; UNITED NATIONS, supra
note 33 (offering a principled approach for corporate fundamental responsibilities in the 
areas of human rights, labor, environment, and anti-corruption); ISO, supra note 33;
GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, G4 SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING GUIDELINES, REPORTING
PRINCIPLES, AND STANDARD DISCLOSURES, available at https://www.globalreporting.org/ 
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corporate performance vague and subject to manipulation.108  Ultimately, 
we need to ask:  whose values does the corporation pursue?  Corporate 
social identities do not necessarily align with social normative 
preferences.109  Social norms and corporate social identities may serve as 
normative substitutes. 
A. Soft Corporate Governance
The quest for virtue shifts corporations from passive to active roles, 
where corporations become a norm-generating authority defining their 
social identities and functions through a local organizational process.110
The resulting reflexive network of corporate social identities is proliferated 
by soft global standardization, setting normative and reporting guidelines 
for corporate social conduct, such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), 
SASB, the UN Global Conduct Principles, the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, and ISO 26000.111
While traditional corporate governance creates mandatory incentives 
and deals with the mitigation of agency costs with a mission to enhance 
shareholder value,112 contemporary corporations adopt a soft, aspirational, 
and voluntary norm-generating process to identify and promote their 
corporate social identities.113  From the traditional financial realm of 
corporations, contemporary corporations proceed to diverse social, 
environmental, and economic agendas,114 reaching far beyond the 
resourcelibrary/GRIG4-Part1-Reporting-Principles-and-Standard-Disclosures.pdf
[https://perma.cc/959Q-TSXC].  The Global Reporting Initiative sets a list of standards for 
corporate self-assessment and reporting, including gender equality and human rights.  
GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIve, supra note 14; see also OECD, supra note 33, (providing 
similar guidelines). 
 108.  Solomon, supra note 35. 
 109.  For articles analyzing this, see generally Bhattacharya, Smith, & Vogel, supra note 
9; Bhattacharya, Hildebrand, & Sankar, supra note 9; Glazer et al., supra note 9; Klein et 
al., supra note 9. 
 110.  See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 393 (2004) (discussing 
the shift to a governance model and the effect that it has on the legal regime). 
 111.  Geczy et al., supra note 2, at 79. 
 112.  Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law?, in THE
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1-19 (Reinier 
R. Kraakman et al. eds., 2004). 
 113.  See GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 14 (explaining that stakeholder 
dialogue is the recommended process for identification of material issues for disclosure 
under the G4).
 114.  For examples of corporate disclosures of activities and agendas in environmental, 
social, and economic realms see supra note 1 (showing various American companies that 
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organizational boundaries and often aiming for global social impact.115
The term “soft” corporate governance thus seeks to describe the 
emerging rules of conduct established and enforced within the corporate 
realm in the absence of directives of hard-binding mandatory corporate 
law.116  Contemporary corporate governance is soft because its norm-
generating authority is the corporation itself, induced by non-binding 
global standardization.117  Jerry Mashaw defines soft law as consisting of 
“social accountability regimes” that are “continuously revisable.”118  In 
contemporary corporate governance, corporations voluntarily assume social 
accountability in a continuously revisable process aiming to define their 
social identities, and to promote their social agendas and regimes of 
voluntary normativity, proliferating their financial purposes and 
notwithstanding them. 
As the corporate social identity is unique to each and every 
corporation, the process of defining agendas for corporate social conduct 
and clarifying corporate social motivation is internal at the local corporate 
level.119  The corporation defines for itself its social agendas, sets its 
normative involvement, and chooses its beneficiaries.120  Far from the top-
down hierarchy of traditional corporate governance, contemporary 
corporations assume an internal decision-making process, to define the 
material contents of the corporation’s non-financial performance.121  The 
corporation’s norm generating role is a decentered process, where 
stakeholders participate in a dynamic and systemic integration of values 
into a voluntary, self-determined corporate social identity.122
are taking active roles in their communities).   
 115.  See generally Part II infra (providing a discussion of corporate social motivation 
beyond organizational boundaries and describing the policy issues relating to corporations’ 
new role in social responsibility). 
 116.  Lobel, supra note 110, at 388. 
 117.  See generally Gersen & Posner, supra note 29 (discussing the importance of soft 
law, specifically congressional law). 
 118. Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the 
Grammar of Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND 
EXPERIENCES 115-156 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006).  
 119.  Liad Ortar, From Flexibility to Specificity: Practical Lessons from Comparing 
Materiality in Sustainability Reports of the World’s Largest Financial Institutions, 1 INT’L J.
CORP. STRATEGY & SOC. RESP. 44, 51 (2016).
 120.  See generally Cafaggi & Pistor, supra note 4 (outlining a theoretical discussion of 
regulatory capabilities).
 121.  See generally Stephen Kim Park & Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, A Firm-Driven 
Approach to Global Governance and Sustainability, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 255 (2015) 
(discussing this contemporary process).
 122.  GRI, for example, recommends a stakeholder dialogue to determine the relative 
materiality of specific sustainability issues.  See Ursa Golob & Klement Podnar, Critical
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The self-determined vision of corporate goodness is thus the result of 
a local decision making process of the corporation, induced and 
proliferated by soft global standardization.123  Corporations do not define 
their social identities in a vacuum:  normative agendas for corporations are 
suggested and promoted by several global initiatives, including the UN 
Global Conduct Principles,124 the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises,125 and ISO 26000.126  Visions of corporate normativity are then 
disclosed under global standards for corporate social transparency, such as 
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)127 and SASB.128  The outcome is a 
social network of corporate visions of goodness, where corporations are 
further influenced to virtuous social conduct by corporate peers and by 
industry standards.129
Points of CSR Related Stakeholder Dialogue in Practice, 23 BUS. ETHICS: A EUR. REV. 248, 
248-257 (July 2014) (advising that in the dialogue of stakeholders, representatives should 
state their views and participate in developing an organizational understanding of a 
corporate social purpose and agenda). 
 123.  See generally Daniel Halberstam, Local, Global and Plural Constitutionalism: 
Europe Meets the World, in THE WORLDS OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, (Gráinne De 
Búrca & J.H.H. Weiler eds., 2012) (discussing the advantages of walking the middle road 
between globalism and localism).  
 124.  See UNITED NATIONS, supra note 33 (outlining that “[t]he UN Global Compact’s 
Ten Principles are derived from: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption”). 
 125.  See OECD, supra note 33 (highlighting that OECD guidelines are divided by 
industry sectors). 
 126.  See INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, supra note 33 
(providing another method by which normative agendas might be defined). 
 127.  See GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 14 (outlining current sustainability 
reporting guidelines). 
 128.  See SASB, supra note 33 (laying out US sustainability disclosure standards). 
 129.  See generally NOAH E. FRIEDKIN, A STRUCTURAL THEORY OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE
(Mark Granovetter ed., 1998) (focusing on the process of social influence, and on how this 
process, when it is played out in a network of interpersonal influence, may result in 
interpersonal agreements among actors who are located in different parts of a complexly 
differentiated organization.  This theory may be applied to the network of different 
corporations in the corporate race to virtue and social identity).  
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TABLE 1: FROM TRADITIONAL TO SOFT CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
B. Corporate Social Motivation and Law 
Understanding the strategic incentives for corporate social motivation 
may serve to create a better architecture of corporate law, focusing on 
variances of corporate conduct that are less likely to be addressed and are 
significantly valuable for social welfare, as demonstrated by illustration 5 
 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
 TRADITIONAL SOFT
NATURE  Centered 
Substantive  
Centralized  
Command-and Control  
Decentered
Reflexive  
Flexible  
Contextualized  
CONTENT  Financial Social, Environmental, 
Economic 
NORM GENERATING 
AUTHORITY
State Corporation, induced
by Global soft 
standardization
INSTITUTIONAL
ORGANIZATION 
Top-down Hierarchy  Stakeholder Dialogue
Informal  
Corporate Decision 
Making Process  
MOTIVATOR FOR 
PRIVATE ACTION 
Liability  Reputation  
Public Image 
Stakeholder Relations
OUTREACH  Within Organizational 
Boundaries
Beyond Organizational 
Boundaries
POWER  Hard 
Coercive
Mandatory  
Soft  
Aspirational
Voluntary
CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK
Mitigate Agency Costs Promote Corporate 
Social Identity 
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below.130  The illustration offers a metric for the evaluation of corporate 
social conduct.131  When a corporation engages in peripheral social activity 
(as demonstrated by sections A and D), assessment of its corporate social 
profile in light of the general value for social welfare is required.  
Examples for such activities are meager budgets dedicated for social 
activities with a high publicity profile, but low social impact.  Finally, 
when a corporation has sufficient strategic incentives to voluntarily engage 
in social conduct that has significant social value, as demonstrated by 
section B in illustration 5, the corporation fulfills a vision for social 
corporate leadership, supplementing or substituting public governance.132
ILLUSTRATION 5: THE METRICS OF CORPORATE VIRTUE
 130.  Consider negative externalities as an example for section C.  While the corporation 
has meager incentives for virtuous conduct, society attributes considerable value to the issue 
at hand and carries its full costs when corporate virtue fails to materialize.  
 131.  Consider each dot as an instance of corporate social conduct.  This schematic table 
should be applied at the specific corporate level, as every corporation would have a different 
profile of social activity and impact.  
 132.  George Serafeim, The Role of the Corporation in Society: An Alternative View and 
Opportunities for Future Research (Harvard Business School, Working Paper No. 14-110, 
2014).
C
Where Law is most 
needed 
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C. Distributional Consequences:  Corporate Legal Particularism and 
the CSR Tax Straddle 
When corporations engage in social agendas, their leadership–
including controlling shareholders and managers–acquires the prerogative 
to sit behind the corporate social wheel.133  Legal rules can specify the 
desired contents, scope, and beneficiaries for corporate social conduct at a 
highly detailed level.134  By contrast, corporate social identities cannot be 
too detailed and nuanced:  because it is incentivized by various 
stakeholders, and highly dependent on public opinion, corporate social 
identities must be easy for the general public to note and identify, and must 
be kept simple,135 leaving the management room for interpretation.  The 
potential for such self-interested interpretation by managers defeats the 
purpose of curbing private advantage.136  Law can be specific, whereas 
morality is ultimately vague.137
The vagueness of virtue allows for self-interested interpretation.  
Because moral rules are so elusive, the interpretation given to them may 
differ among various constituencies and may lead to aversion.  Lack of 
specific legal standards can be misused.  Consider for example the recent 
scandal of Volkswagen in late 2015:  from the top of the list of car firms in 
the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, it was caught using sophisticated 
software to avoid compliance with environmental regulation.138  Indeed, 
morality is often disappointing.  “If I had a yaller dog that didn’t know no 
more than a person’s conscience does, I would pison him” declares 
Huckleberry Finn towards the end of his journey down the Mississippi,139
 133.  See Part II A supra (providing an analysis and review of empirical evidence of 
agency costs in corporate social responsibility). 
 134.  Shavell, supra note 36, at 233-34.
 135.  Id. at 234.
 136.  Id.
 137.  Id.
 138.  See generally Enrique Dans, Volkswagen and the Failure of Corporate Social 
Responsibility, FORBES (Sept. 27, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/ 
welcome/?toURL=http://www.forbes.com/sites/enriquedans/2015/09/27/volkswagen-and-
the-failure-of-corporate-social-responsibility/&refURL=https://www.google.com/
&referrer=https://www.google.com/ [https://perma.cc/SM5G-QTZW] (discussing the 
Volkswagen emission regulation scandal).
 139. MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN 161-162, 175 (Dover
Publications, Inc. 1994) (stating that Huck’s conscience tells him that “the right thing and 
the clean thing”‘ is to return his friend Jim to his legal owner, Miss Watson, and that 
otherwise he will be doomed to hell.  His inner voice, on the other hand, reminds him that 
Jim is his best friend, and it is better to be in hell with friends than to be saved from it with 
Miss Watson.  Huck decides to be true to himself, and follow his inner self- voice.  “All 
right, then, I’ll go to hell,” he states: “I would take up wickedness again.”).  
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having realized that human conscience can sometimes justify the cruelty 
and injustice of slavery.  Virtuous corporations require delegation of 
authority to determine the normative contents of compliance and such 
delegation can be misinterpreted and misused.140
Indeed, the nature and content of corporate social identities is decided 
and framed by the corporation for itself.  When corporations pursue values, 
an immediate and pertinent concern is whose values are pursued and in 
service of what interests.  Katharina Pistor warns of “corporate legal 
particularism,” referring to a self-contained legal order that serves special 
interests.141  Like beauty, normative agendas are ultimately in the eye of the 
beholder.  Attitudes on what is socially responsible are “rather 
unscientific . . . and based on little information . . . framing is bound to 
distort assessments: the choice of presenting a firm’s rationale for locating 
a plant in a low-labour-cost country as ‘helping a poor country to develop’ 
or ‘minimizing labour cost’ is obviously not neutral.”142  Thus, reports of 
corporate social responsibility vary in content, and they frequently refer to 
the corporation’s core business.  For example, the training and 
development of employees is often considered a manifestation of corporate 
social responsibility and included in social responsibility reports, despite its 
obvious contribution to the core business mission of the corporation.143
Corporate social identities may differ from each other quite extensively, 
and there may be fundamental disagreements within a corporation about 
what is the morally right way to behave. 
Corporate social identities create a distributional tension, because the 
social priorities of the corporation may differ from those of the public.  As 
the CSR tax straddle demonstrates, corporations may choose to engage in 
voluntary corporate social conduct while making strenuous efforts to 
minimize and even avoid paying tax.144  Consider for example Pfizer, 
“embracing . . .  responsibility to society . . . helping the world’s poor gain 
access to its products,” and “strengthen[ing] and improv[ing] health-care 
 140.  See generally Shavell, supra note 36; Solomon, supra note 35 (both discussing law 
and morality). 
 141.  Pistor, supra note 37. 
 142.  Bénabou & Tirole, supra note 28, at 15 (discussing socially responsible behavior as 
a means to further societal goals); id. at 19.
 143.  See, e.g., CSR Report 2016, SONY 122-135 (2016), 
http://www.sony.net/SonyInfo/csr_report/ [https://perma.cc/2REP-3G4Z] (describing 
Sony’s recruiting and training of employees as corporate social responsibility).  
 144.  See generally Social Saints, Fiscal Fiends, THE ECONOMIST: SCHUMPETER BLOG
(Jan. 2, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/business-and-finance/21684770-social-
saints-fiscal-fiends-opinions-vary-whether-firms-can-be-socially-responsible 
[https://perma.cc/9HXN-Q5BQ] (commenting on the tension between a corporation’s goal 
to seek lower taxes and be socially responsible).
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systems,”145 while planning to shift its tax domicile from America to 
Ireland, where corporate income taxes are considerably lower.146  Another 
example is Etsy, a handmade good marketplace that went public in the U.S. 
in 2015 as a certified B Corporation and simultaneously reorganized its 
Irish subsidiary in a way that conceals its tax-cutting arrangements from 
public view.147  Recent empirical research finds evidence that corporate 
social responsibility is negatively related to five-year cash-effective tax 
rates and positively related to tax lobbying expenditures, suggesting that, 
on average, corporate social responsibility and tax payments act as 
normative substitutes.148  Companies pursue their own values in their self-
determined normative social identities where the corporation has a self-
determined authority to specify the beneficiaries, the methods of 
engagement, and the amount of resources devoted to its self-determined 
social causes.  Corporate social identities may thus pose a normative 
substitute for the tax system for social redistribution, and may challenge the 
democratic ideal. 
CONCLUSION
With the popularity of Benefit Corporations and the rising trend of 
corporate social initiatives by traditional C Corporations, the vision of 
corporations actively generating their own norms of social conduct in 
pursuit of their self-determined set of values is emerging as a prominent 
model of corporate social conduct.  This article analyzed the emerging 
trend of “Corporate Social Identities,” arguing that incentives for corporate 
social motivation are often rooted in the business purpose itself.  
Corporations are induced to normative social conduct by their stakeholder 
constituencies:  investors follow their conscience in responsible 
investments; employees are better engaged, more productive and are easier 
to recruit by ethical corporate employers; and consumers attribute virtue to 
 145.  Id.; see also Corporate Responsibility: Bridging the Gap to Access for Patients in 
Need, PFIZER, http://www.pfizer.com/responsibility [https://perma.cc/DJW3-979R] (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2017) (discussing Pfizer’s corporate social responsibility). 
 146.  See generally Liz Hoffman, Richard Rubin & Jonathan D. Rockoff, Taxes Drive 
Potential Merger of Pfizer, Allergan, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/allergan-confirms-pfizer-talks-1446126062?mg=id-wsj
[https://perma.cc/JT7M-WL3J] (discussing Pfizer’s potential merger for tax purposes). 
 147.  Jesse Drucker & Alex Barinka, Etsy’s B Corp Status Challenged by Tax Group 
Over Irish Haven, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2015-09-01/etsy-s-b-corp-status-challenged-by-tax-group-over-irish-haven
[https://perma.cc/2X9H-UKS7]. 
 148.  Angela K. Davis et al., Do Socially Responsible Firms Pay More Taxes?, 91
ACCOUNTING REV. 47 (2016).
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moral brands, and might sanction the transgression of social norms by 
consumer boycotts.  Management’s private values induce the corporation to 
social engagement.  In addition, corporate social activity may serve a 
political strategy, manipulating desired regulation or lack thereof.  
Understanding the strategic incentives for corporate social motivation may 
serve to create a better architecture of corporate law.  When the strategic 
incentives for corporate social conduct are high, and the social value of 
corporate social conduct significant, the corporation may fulfill the vision 
for social leadership supplementing or substituting public governance.  
Law is most needed when the incentives for corporate social conduct are 
insufficient, but the social value significant. 
In particular, the analysis of corporate social motivation may lead to 
full modeling of corporate social engagement, subject to empirical 
evaluation.  Future attention should be paid to how global and domestic 
mechanisms may play a role in creating incentives diverting corporate 
social motivation towards fulfilling significant social value in alignment 
with social interests. 
